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What is a Search Engine? The Simple Question the 
Court of Justice of the European Union Forgot to Ask 





The Court of Justice of the E.U.’s right to be forgotten ruling, which subjected search 
engines to the Data Protection Directive’s restrictions, was controversial from the moment it was 
delivered. Free speech advocates claimed that the ruling authorized needless censorship, while 
privacy rights advocates argued that the ruling provided much-needed privacy protection in the 
internet age. The right to be forgotten ruling is deliberately broad, yet reinforces the Directive’s 
journalistic exception to protect free speech. However, the CJEU’s failure to define the term 
“search engine” in its decision unintentionally allows the Directive’s exception to be circumvented. 
More countries outside the E.U. are beginning to express an interest in recognizing a right to be 
forgotten within domestic laws, it is important that the right to be forgotten’s scope be clarified 
sooner rather than later. A few countries are skeptical of recognizing a right to be forgotten due 
to its breadth, which could be made worse if the term “search engine” is not refined. While the 
right to be forgotten could be incorporated into existing international law, having search engines 
apply their right to be forgotten policies internationally is the most realistic way of meeting the 
growing demand. Therefore, these concerns must be addressed so that search engines can 
comfortably satisfy the global community’s need to protect citizens’ data privacy. 
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I.  SEARCH ENGINES AND THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 
In May of 2014, the Court of Justice of the E.U. (CJEU) jeopardized the 
fundamental right to free speech in order to protect the individual’s privacy rights. 
In its groundbreaking right to be forgotten ruling, the CJEU clarified the E.U.’s 
Data Protection Directive (Directive),1 holding that the Directive applied not only 
to source websites, but also to search engines.2 Many European countries already 
vehemently protect their citizens’ individual privacy, and this ruling further 
entrenches this protection. The U.S., on the other hand, prizes the right to free 
speech above many fundamental human rights, including privacy.3 Because the 
Directive is now understood to apply to the most basic and easily-utilized medium 
of accessing information,4 free speech advocates are worried. And while many 
consider bringing search engines within the Directive’s scope to be over-inclusive, 
the CJEU’s ruling may be even broader than scholars initially thought. The right 
to be forgotten ruling provides only one example of a search engine—Google, the 
defendant in the case—but its description of a search engine is ambiguous and 
broad, making it ripe for exploitation. If this characterization remains unrestricted, 
expanding privacy rights could further restrict rights to freedom of speech. 
However, the E.U. is unlikely to be so dismissive of the right to free speech. 
The E.U. enacted the Directive to protect privacy.5 With an emphasis on 
personal autonomy and an eye toward the rapid technological evolution, the 
Directive established legal standards for data processing that ensured that 
individuals could maintain a degree of control over their data and reputation.6 
                                                 
1  It is important to note that, although the CJEU decision was based on its interpretation of the 
Directive, the E.U. is currently in the process of adopting a reform that would update the 
Directive. The E.U. refers to the reform as the General Data Protection Regulation. One of the 
biggest changes the General Data Protection Regulation will make to the Directive is its formal 
inclusion of the right to be forgotten, although the right’s boundaries still remain vague. Otherwise, 
the General Data Protection Regulation’s reforms do not affect this Comment’s analysis. See 
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regards to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General 
Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter General Data Protection 
Regulation]. 
2  Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, (2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&docla
ng=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=542615 (last visited Apr. 19, 2016). 
3  Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Balancing Freedom of Speech on the Internet under International Law, 39 N.C. J. INT’L. 
& COM. REG. 701, 716 (2014). 
4  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement 
of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of 
Personal Data]. 
5  See generally id. 
6  See generally id. 
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Even though the Directive authorizes online content removal in the name 
of privacy protection, it still considers the fundamental importance of the right to 
free speech. The Directive limits its purview to include exemptions––for example, 
for “solely . . . journalistic purposes”––to complying with right to be forgotten 
requests.7 However, since these limitations are confined to specific data uses, they 
are unlikely to restrain the scope of search engines subject to the Directive’s 
mandate. By identifying specific exceptions, the Directive intends for courts to 
apply them narrowly. 
There is a general assumption that a search engine is a stand-alone website 
dedicated solely to indexing the World Wide Web and providing organized 
hyperlinks to web pages in response to search terms.8 Web giants like Google and 
Yahoo are frequently cited examples illustrating this assumption.9 Contrary to this 
usage, the E.U. Courts and the CJEU Advocates General have adopted a broader 
interpretation of what a search engine is. They refer to any search feature—even 
internal ones operating solely within other websites10––linking users to websites 
based on the user’s choice of search terms as a “search engine.”11 Such a nebulous 
                                                 
7  Id. at art. 9. 
8  See What is a Search Engine, B.B.C., (June 6, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/webwise/0/22562913. 
9  See, e.g., Google Spain SL, supra note 2, ¶ 20; Case C-202/12, Innoweb BV v. Wegener ICT Media 
BV, ¶ 24 (2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=145914& 
pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=545155 (last visited Apr. 
19, 2016); Case C-657/11, Belgian Electronic Sorting Technology NV v. Bert Peelaers, ¶ 21 (2013), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=135471&pageIndex=0&docla
ng=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=546526 (last visited Apr. 20, 2016); Case C-
324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay International AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶¶ 31, 38; Opinion of Advocate 
General Jääskinen, Interflora Inc v. Marks & Spencer plc, Case C-323/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-8630, 
¶ 16. 
10  For example, these internal search engines may be featured within legal research sites, social media, 
and even court websites. For examples on how the Advocates General of the CJEU have used 
“search engine” broadly, see, for example, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Proposed Accession 
of the E.U. to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, ¶ 224 (2014), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= 
CELEX:62013CP0002&from=EN (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (referring to HUDOC’s search 
feature as a search engine); Yvette Ostolaza and Ricardo Pellafone, Applying Model Rule 4.2 to Web 
2.0: The Problem of Social Networking Sites, 11 J. HIGH TECH. L. 56, 66 (2010) (referring to social 
networksearch features as “internal search engine[s]”); Katja Weckström, Liability for Trademark 
Infringement for Internet Service Providers, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 12 (2012) (referring to 
eBay’s search feature as an “internal search engine”). 
11  Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 43, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87207 (last visited April. 20, 2016) (referring to HUDOC’s 
search feature as a search engine); Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. 
Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, Case C-131/12 ¶ 33 (2013), http://curia.europa.eu/ 
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=138782&page. 
 Index=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=554529 (last visited Apr. 20, 
2016); Case T-186/12, Copernicus-Trademarks Ltd v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal 
The Right to be Forgotten Kerr 
Summer 2016 221 
interpretation can pose a problem for free speech advocates: subjecting any and 
all search features to the Directive could entirely suppress even purely journalistic 
information, despite any exemptions.12 
The CJEU’s right to be forgotten ruling failed to define “search engine” for 
purposes of the Directive; Google was the defendant in the case, therefore the 
assumptions described above were not challenged. There are three resulting 
problems from this assumption. First, when this ruling is taken to its logical limit, 
the Directive could apply to the internal search engines operating within 
government, police, and court websites, among others, forcing these websites to 
delink and remove content specifically published for public benefit. Some lawyers 
have alleged that others within the industry have already abused the right to be 
forgotten.13 The right may be further exploited if “search engine” is intended to 
be an all-inclusive term: it will increase the pool of potential clients whom lawyers 
may seek to needlessly represent in right to be forgotten actions. 
Second, administrative costs from sorting through removal requests will be 
much greater if the CJEU intended for “search engine” to apply to a larger pool 
of data controllers under the Directive. Google’s Transparency Report reveals that 
people have eagerly invoked the right to be forgotten ruling: 419,516 recent 
requests have already been made to remove 1,458,691 URLs from Google as of 
April 20, 2016.14 Defining the scope of the applicable entities could affect how 
                                                 
Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), ¶ 72 (2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165226&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&oc
c=first&part=1&cid=554796 (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (using “search engine” to apply to two non-
Google Internet sites, one of them being private); Case C-202/12, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8–9 (referring to 
websites other than Google as providing or containing search engines); Thaddeus J. Holynski, Legal 
Research on the World Wide Web, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2002) (including LawCrawler and 
LawRunner as examples of search engines). 
12  For example, while an individual may not request that a news article mentioning that individual’s 
name be removed, that individual may request standard search engines, such as Google, along with 
any other internal search engine that may archive that information, to remove links to it such that 
the information becomes virtually inaccessible. See FACTSHEET ON THE “RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN” RULING (C-131/12), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/ 
factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2016); GOOGLE COURT DECISION: THE 
RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN?, http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2014/may/29/google-
court-decision-the-right-to-be-forgotten (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). 
13  These claims include accusing “ambulance-chasing lawyers” of capitalizing on the breadth of CJEU’s 
right to be forgotten ruling and manipulating people into believing that they must hire a lawyer to 
help them remove their data from the Internet. In actuality, people can make right to be forgotten 
requests on their own, for free. See Chris Green, Law Firms Exploiting E.U. ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling 
to Help Individuals Remove Awkward Newspaper Articles from Google, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 17, 2015), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/law-firms-exploiting-eu-right-to-be-
forgotten-ruling-to-help-individuals-remove-awkward-newspaper-10185164.html. 
14  EUROPEAN PRIVACY REQUESTS FOR SEARCH REMOVALS, https://www.google.com/transparency 
report/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en (last visited Apr. 20, 2016). 
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many more requests can be made and of which entities. On small-scale or 
governmental websites containing internal search engines, publishers may hesitate 
to post information whether or not it violates the Directive due to these costs. 
Third, broadly defining “search engine” could nullify the effectiveness of 
virtually all resources connecting the public to information that is otherwise 
difficult to find. Freedom of speech concerns become apparent in this context: 
publishing web content freely would mean little if its exposure and accessibility is 
limited or non-existent. Almost every (American) article written on the right to be 
forgotten decries the right’s imposition on freedom of speech and the “rewrit[ing 
of] history” it allows.15 Free speech advocates are particularly concerned about 
rewriting history in the internet context since the internet is celebrated for its 
ability to preserve and disseminate information to a wide audience.16 Because of 
the Directive’s impact on information produced on the internet, and the growing 
international interest in the right to be forgotten, it is important to clarify what 
“search engine” means for the Directive’s purposes. 
It is very likely that the CJEU understood the Directive as broadly including 
all forms––internal and external––of search engines to maintain the high level of 
commitment and protection European states traditionally afford to personality 
rights.17 Member States’ balancing of personality rights against the freedom of 
speech supports this position. France and Germany explicitly protect personality 
                                                 
15  Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic 
Data Flow, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 349, 354 (2015) (declaring that the Right to be Forgotten 
“cannibalize[s] free expression”). For some examples see Patricia Sánchez Abril & Jacqueline D. 
Lipton, The Right to be Forgotten: Who Decides What the World Forgets?, 103 KY. L.J. 363, 384 (2015) 
(“Asking entities . . . [to implement] a right to be forgotten is, in some ways, asking for the right 
to . . . overtake other rights, like freedom of expression”); Emily Adams Shoor, Narrowing the Right 
to be Forgotten: Why the European Union Needs to Amend the Proposed Data Protection Regulation, 39 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 487, 493 (2014) (noting that European countries “place a greater premium on 
individual privacy,” which affects how the Directive prioritizes the Right to be Forgotten over 
freedom of speech). 
16 Fundamental Freedoms: Internet Privacy and Speech, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, 
https://ccla.org/issues/fundamental-freedoms/internet-privacy-and-speech/ (last visited Apr. 15, 
2016). 
17  Personality rights protect “various attributes of personality [including] privacy, image, voice, bodily 
integrity, name, and reputation.” Eric H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony: Comparative Perspectives on 
the Right to One’s Image, 76 TUL. L. REV. 673, 680 (2002). 
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and privacy rights18 in their constitutions,19 and the E.U.’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights also protects these rights.20 
This Comment will look to European values, case law, and legislation to 
predict whether the Directive applies to search engines in their broadest sense, or 
if some restrictions can be implied from the CJEU ruling. Section II will describe 
the right to be forgotten ruling that sparked the debate over whether privacy and 
speech rights can coexist. Section III of this Comment will explore how the term 
“search engine” has been applied within the European judicial and legislative 
contexts. Section IV will examine the Directive and how European Courts have 
interpreted it. Section V will examine European case law and legislation balancing 
privacy rights against the freedom of speech for guidance on how broad the 
Directive is intended to be. Finally, Section VI will expand the right to be 
forgotten analysis to the international context to predict what the global future of 
this Right might be. 
II.  THE CJEU’S R IGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN RULING  
In this technology age, States face the novel challenge of how to maintain 
the free flow of communication while balancing the need to protect their citizens’ 
privacy and data distribution rights.21 The E.U. enacted the Directive to tackle this 
problem. The Directive’s legal standards apply to any entity or person that handles 
personal data.22 It requires that personal data be lawfully processed, legitimately 
and purposefully collected, relevant, accurate and complete, and that it identify 
the “data subject for no longer than necessary.”23 If a data controller does not 
comply with these requirements, an individual can request the “erasure or 
blocking of [unlawfully processed] data.”24 As with most E.U. laws, the Directive 
is meant only as a floor upon which Member States, while incorporating the 
Directive into domestic legislation, may flesh out the particularities for their 
                                                 
18  Personality and privacy rights developed out of the recognition that individuals need to develop 
their character independent of outside influences. See Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 
59320/00, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 25, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109029 (last visited Apr. 
21, 2016). 
19  See generally GRUNDEGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDEGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.) translation at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de 
/pdf/80201000.pdf; CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 9 (Fr.). 
20  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 1, 7, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 9. 
21  Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, art. 1. 
22  Id. at art. 6. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. at art. 12(b). 
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national needs and values.25 Therefore, the Directive was intentionally drafted with 
flexibility, necessitating clarification by national legislation and the E.U. courts. 
This section will describe the CJEU’s 2014 right to be forgotten ruling, which was 
a major step toward refining the Directive’s applicability. 
The Directive may apply to websites creating and publishing source 
information. Therefore, Google argued that since search engines do not actually 
produce online content, but instead act as a conduit to distribute that material to 
internet users, they cannot qualify as data controllers under the Directive.26 The 
CJEU, in what has since been referred to as the right to be forgotten ruling, instead 
held that search engines must remove links to qualifying personal information 
upon a valid request.27 The CJEU noted that, by providing links to information 
relating to an individual in response to searching their name, search engines could 
negatively infringe on that individual’s privacy rights.28 The CJEU justified its 
holding by relying on the Directive’s purpose and terminology therein, including 
definitions for “controller,” “personal data,” and “processing of personal data.”29 
The Directive defines a “data controller” as any “natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others 
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”30 The 
Directive defines “personal data” as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can 
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity.”31 This includes identification numbers and 
“physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural[, and] social identity” 
characteristics.32 The Directive defines the “processing of personal data” as 
particular actions including the “collection, recording, organization, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, 
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, 
erasure or destruction” of personal data, whether automatic or not.33 
                                                 
25  Id. at art. 4 (authorizing member states to enact their own national legislation incorporating the 
Directive). 
26 Case C-131/12, supra note 2, ¶ 22. 
27  Id. ¶ 41. 
28 Id. ¶¶ 37, 38. 
29  Id. ¶¶ 25, 26, 32. 
30  Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, art. 2(d). 
31  Id. art. 2(b). The General Data Protection Regulation’s definition of data controller is virtually the 
same as the Directive’s definition of the term. See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 1, 
art. 4. 
32  Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, art. 2(a). 
33  Id. at art. 2(b). 
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Therefore, in order for the Directive to apply to search engines, search 
engines must be considered data controllers that process personal data.34 The 
CJEU explicitly characterized a search engine’s activities as “‘collect[ing]’ such 
data which it subsequently ‘retrieves,’ ‘records’ and ‘organises’ within the 
framework of its indexing programmes, ‘stores’ on its servers and . . . ‘discloses’ 
and ‘makes available’ to its users in the form of lists of search results.”35 
Since these activities mirror the Directive’s definition of “personal data 
processor”, the CJEU found that search engines clearly perform that function.36 
And by processing personal data, search engines fall squarely within the “data 
controller” classification.37 
The CJEU acknowledged that, while the Directive intended for the 
definition of “controller” to be broad,38 there are limits to accommodate purely 
journalistic data.39 However, this exemption may only apply to publishers of such 
data. Therefore, the CJEU held that search engines cannot benefit from this 
exemption because, while search engines can link users to journalistic articles, 
search engines themselves do not publish that data.40 Further, the Directive is 
concerned with data processers that needlessly impinge upon privacy rights; 
journalistic data is necessary to inform the public, making it exempt from the 
Directive’s restrictions. Therefore, the CJEU argues that search engines are 
precisely the type of data processors the Directive intends to regulate: search 
engines are widely used, allowing them to encroach on privacy rights far more 
easily than website publishers can on their own.41 Search engines play an active 
role when linking information to users; they archive websites containing personal 
data and disseminate information to an audience that may not otherwise have 
direct access to this personal information.42 This easy access to personal data, 
which has the potential to harm an individual’s reputation, is precisely what the 
Directive and the CJEU target. 
                                                 
34  Id. at art. 2(d). 
35  Case C-131/12, supra note 2, ¶ 28. 
36  Id. ¶ 26. 
37  Id. ¶ 32. 
38  Id. ¶ 34. 
39  Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, art. 9. An example 
of this exception would be a news article published on the B.B.C. 
40  Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, arts. 17, 37; Case 
C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. ¶ 36-38, 
¶ 85. 
41  Id. ¶ 36-38. 
42  Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, ¶¶ 37–38, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&docla
ng=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=542615 (last visited Mar. 16, 2016). 
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III.  APPLICATION OF THE TERM “SEARCH ENGINE” 
Determining how broad the CJEU intended the scope of “search engine” to 
be is a difficult task. The term “search engine” has been used in a variety of legal 
contexts within the E.U. Generally, E.U. courts have defined and used the term 
broadly and have applied it to internal search engines within websites. For 
example, in a European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case involving the 
alleged interception of certain communications, the court loosely referred to a 
search engine as “[a]n automated sorting system.”43 This definition includes 
systems with a wide range of search features and does not exclude those operating 
internally within websites. Reviewing E.U. case law, officials’ statements, and 
legislation for common definitions of “search engine” will provide guidance on 
how to interpret the usage of “search engine” in the right to be forgotten ruling. 
Former Advocate General of the CJEU,44 Niilo Jääskinen,45 delivered an 
Opinion on the right to be forgotten case. In his Opinion, he further clarified the 
court’s explanation of how search engines operate.46 According to Advocate 
General Jääskinen, a search engine processes internet content “from existing 
websites, [by] cop[ying], analy[zing] and index[ing] that content on its own 
devices,”47 but is not involved in the actual creation of web content. When the 
search engine receives search terms from a user, it provides that user with 
hyperlinks to existing web content based on the search terms.48 This inclusive 
definition does not restrict the types of search engines subject to the Directive. 
And since many internal search engines operate similarly––linking users to results 
from the sites’ own archives––it appears that they also must comply with right to 
be forgotten requests. 
Advocate General Kokott of the CJEU49 continued along this broad vein. In 
a non-binding Opinion, she referred to the ECtHR’s own internal search feature 
as a “search engine.”50 This reflects, in the E.U., the common usage of “search 
engine” as applying to all forms of search engine, without limitation. Since the 
                                                 
43  Liberty v. United Kingdom, supra note 12, ¶ 43, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87207 (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2016). 
44  At the CJEU, there is one judge from each of the E.U. countries, and 11 Advocates General. During 
the public hearing stage, the CJEU may decide that the Advocate General must publish an opinion 
regarding the case at issue, which is to be delivered after the hearing. See COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2016). 
45  FORMER MEMBERS, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_9606/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2016). 
46  Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, supra note 10, ¶¶ 32–35. 
47  Id. ¶ 34. 
48  Id. ¶ 33. 
49  Advocate General Kokott is one of the 11 working for the CJEU. See PRESENTATION OF THE 
MEMBERS, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026 (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
50  Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 11. 
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Directive would apply to even the ECtHR’s internal search engine,51 it is possible 
that a right to be forgotten request, albeit legitimate, would force the suppression 
of data published by the ECtHR. 
In another case involving Google, the CJEU described Google’s search 
engine as a tool that guides users to relevant webpages based on their search 
queries.52 This characterization also applies to internal search engines within 
websites also provide the same function to users of those websites. 
Therefore, the E.U. legislative and judicial contexts would suggest that the 
CJEU likely intended for the term “search engine” to be broadly read, without 
restrictions to its applicability. 
IV.  THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE  
The Directive arose out of a growing concern that advancements in the 
Internet and its global reach necessitated that the right to be forgotten be 
modernized to keep up with these developments.53 The Directive is binding and 
most Member States have implemented it through domestic legislation.54 A few 
Member States––including France, Ireland, Lithuania, Sweden, and Spain––
already had data protection and privacy legislation before the Directive’s 
enactment. But the European Commission felt that it would be beneficial to enact 
a uniform, current data protection law to reduce the administrative and economic 
burdens resulting from disparities between member states.55 This Section will 
closely examine the Directive to determine how broad the right to be forgotten 
was intended to be, and if there are any conceivable limits to the right. 
By implementing the Directive, as well as adhering to the right to be 
forgotten ruling, Member States’ data protection and privacy legislation must 
contemplate search engines as data controllers. However, the right to be forgotten 
ruling is not the only case requiring the CJEU’s guidance on the Directive’s 
parameters. Since its enactment, the Directive has faced backlash regarding its 
                                                 
51  The Directive’s exception will not apply to the ECtHR’s internal search engine because the ECtHR 
is not a publisher of purely journalistic data. 
52  Case C-236/08, Google France Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶ 22. 
53  FACTSHEET ON THE “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN” RULING (C-131/12), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 
2016). 
54  E.U. directives act as baselines for the member states that they must implement within their 
jurisdictions. However, they can expand upon the directives to suit their needs. See E.U. 
LEGISLATION: WHAT IS AN E.U. DIRECTIVE?, http://www.europeanlawmonitor.org/what-is-guide-
to-key-eu-terms/eu-legislation-what-is-an-eu-directive.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2016). 
55  Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, art. 1; REFORM OF 
THE DATA PROTECTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE E.U., http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/reform/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2016). 
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potential transgression on the freedom of speech.56 Some of this criticism has 
found its way into the CJEU’s docket. Therefore, it is useful to examine the 
CJEU’s approach to dealing with the issue of the Directive’s conflict with the 
freedom of speech as it may illuminate how comprehensive the Directive’s scope 
is. 
A Swedish case involving the publishing of personal information on the 
Internet without the subject’s permission dealt with the interaction between free 
speech and privacy rights.57 In 1998, Bodil Lindqvist launched a website 
containing information about herself and her colleagues.58 Ms. Lindqvist had not 
obtained her colleagues’ consent before publishing the information.59 Despite the 
need to protect personal data, the importance of balancing this interest with the 
freedom of speech was not lost on the court.60 The CJEU acknowledged that 
Member States had the authority to enact stricter regulations than those contained 
in the Directive when implementing the Directive into their legislation.61 But the 
domestic regulations must maintain the Directive’s balance between the 
individual’s right to have personal data protected and the right to free speech.62 
Therefore, the Directive itself, as well as member states’ implementation thereof, 
cannot be so broad as to flatly obstruct the freedom of speech, even for the sake 
of data privacy.63 The CJEU asserted that the Directive’s privacy objective is not 
wholly supreme over the freedom of speech.64 However, the CJEU provided no 
guidance as to where the balance between the two competing rights lies, leaving 
the Member States to solve this conundrum on a case-by-case basis.65 
In a Finnish case involving a newspaper’s publication of public tax 
information, the CJEU declared the freedom of speech to be a broadly interpreted 
fundamental right.66 A local newspaper enlisted the company Markkinaporssi to 
provide the surnames and personal tax data of individuals exceeding a certain 
income threshold.67 Markkinaporssi collected the information from sources that 
                                                 
56  Chelsea E. Carbone, To Be or Not to Be Forgotten: Balancing the Right to Know with the Right to Privacy in 
the Digital Age, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 525, 560 (2015). 
57  Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-19271. 
58  Id. ¶¶ 12, 13. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. ¶¶ 10, 14. 
61  Id. ¶ 84. 
62  Id. ¶ 85.  
63  Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, arts. 1(37), 9. 
64  The Directive allows member states to “restrict[ ] the scope of . . . the obligations” of data controllers 
in certain circumstances, including where national or public security are primary concerns. See id. ¶ 7; 
Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, art. 13. 
65  Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-19271, ¶ 90. 
66  Case C-73/07, Tietusuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunan Markkinaporssi Oy, 2008 E.C.R. I-9831, ¶ 56. 
67  Case C-73/07, Tietusuojavaltuutettu, 2008 E.C.R. I-9831, ¶¶ 25, 26. 
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the Finnish tax authority made public.68 Some of those individuals requested 
Markkinaporssi to cease collecting their information under the Directive; it 
refused, and the individuals sued.69 The court examined the Directive’s position 
on privacy rights versus the freedom of speech to decide whether processing 
personal data with the purpose of publishing the tax data was protected by the 
Directive’s free speech exemptions.70 The court found that the Directive does not 
impinge upon the individual’s freedom of speech for the sake of privacy rights 
since the Directive specifically aims to “reconcile” the two.71 In fact, the court 
acknowledged that the freedom of speech is a broad right.72 The Directive upholds 
freedom of speech, according to the court, by providing exemptions for purely 
journalistic purposes.73 This exemption protects the public’s interest in accessing 
information. However, the freedom of speech is protected only to the extent it is 
used for purely journalistic purposes.74  
Therefore, the Directive makes clear that protecting privacy rights is often 
the default and exceptions to it are narrow. Because the CJEU likely understood 
the Directive this way, the right to be forgotten ruling probably intended to 
continue this broad reading of the Directive.75 
V.  PERSONALITY AND PRIVACY RIGHTS IN EUROPE  
Having control over one’s image is a fundamental––even constitutional––
principle in many European countries.76 Yet, the freedom of speech is also a 
constitutional guarantee.77 Often the two rights conflict where information 
identifying an individual is published through an online medium, potentially 
damaging the individual’s reputation. In the U.S., the freedom of speech is a 
deeply entrenched and protected right;78 in Europe, if an individual’s personality 
rights are truly at stake, those rights will take precedence over the freedom of 
                                                 
68  Id. ¶ 25. 
69  Id. ¶¶ 31, 32. 
70  Id. ¶ 1. 
71  Id. ¶ 54. 
72  Id. ¶ 56. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  Aidan Forde, Implications of the Right to be Forgotten, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 83, 105 (2015) 
(observing that the CJEU broadly interpreted the Directive’s definition of “controller”).  
76  Information Society, Privacy and Data Protection, EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS, http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/information-society-privacy-and-data-protection (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
77  Id. 
78  Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren & Brandeis Tort is Alive and Well and 
Flourishing in Paris, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1219, 1227 (1994). 
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speech.79 This Section will examine the E.U.’s view of personality rights, as well 
as particular member states’ attempts to balance the competing principles. 
Looking to the broader European context, Article 8 of the European 
Convention for Human Rights (Convention) provides a legal guarantee of privacy 
rights, stating that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private . . . life.”80 
The ECtHR has concluded that privacy rights protection, as guaranteed by Article 
8, is meant to allow each person to develop their personality “without outside 
interference.”81 The Directive specifically seeks to recognize these fundamental 
personality and privacy rights included in the Convention.82 
The E.U.’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter) also reinforces the 
sanctity of privacy and personality rights. Article 1 of the Charter protects human 
dignity above all else.83 Article 7 of the Charter protects the individual’s private 
life (like Articles 1 and 2 of Germany’s Basic Law, and Article 9 of France’s Civil 
Code, discussed below); Article 8 of the Charter protects data subjects by granting 
them the right to consent, access, and to rectify personal information.84 
Because Member States have valued these privacy rights for decades, the 
E.U. was likely inspired to formally recognize these rights. Both France and 
Germany have a strong tradition of protecting personality and privacy rights. 
Article 9 of the French Civil Code recognizes the right to privacy in everyone.85 
But it also recognizes the freedom of speech in Article 10 of the French Civil 
Code. 86 France places an enormous value on privacy rights: privacy rights are 
guaranteed and viewed “as essential to the defense of human dignity against the 
onslaught of electronic technology.”87 France’s highest court, the Cour de 
                                                 
79  Scott J. Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights for Public Figures, 49 
AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 160–61 (2012). 
80  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention on Human 
Rights]. 
81  Von Hannover v. Germany, ¶ 95. This can be understood as protecting individuals’ expectation to 
carry on certain aspects of their lives in a manner they choose, without involving anyone else. See 
Niemietz v. Germany, App. No. 13710/88, 1992 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 29, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-57887 (last visited Apr. 21, 2016). 
82  Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, ¶ 1. 
83  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 21, art. 1. 
84  Id. at art. 8. 
85  CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 9 (Fr.). 
86  Id. at art. 10. 
87  Hauch, supra note 82, at 1223. 
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Cassation,88 has held that “French courts must . . . plac[e] limits on free expression 
to protect privacy.”89 
Germany’s Basic Law recognizes personality rights in Articles 1 and 2.90 
Article 1 declares that “[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable.”91 Article 2 states that 
“[e]very person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar 
as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional 
order or the moral law”92 and “[f]reedom of the person shall be inviolable.”93 
Privacy rights can be found within personality rights: courts protect privacy rights 
to ensure the protection of personality rights.94 The Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany summarized personality rights as the following: 
The general right of personality and its special manifestations, like the right 
to one’s own picture and the right to one’s name, protect not only non-
material but also commercial personality interests. If these components of the 
right of personality which are of financial value are culpably infringed by an 
unauthorized use of a picture, name or other characteristic feature of the 
personality, the holder of the right of personality is entitled to a claim to 
compensation for harm, [independent] of the severity of the interference.95 
This emphasizes the importance Germany places on personality and privacy 
rights. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has held that human dignity 
is inviolable, even in the face of the freedom of speech and art.96 Personality rights 
can supersede the freedom of speech in the following circumstances: 
[T]rue statements . . . are likely to have a negative effect on the person or his 
reputation, which is disproportionate to the interest of disseminating the 
truth. This is in particular the case where statements reach a wide audience 
                                                 
88  ABOUT THE COURT, COUR DE CASSATION, https://www.courdecassation.fr/about_the_court 
_9256.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2016). 
89  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 2e civ., July 8, 1981, Bull. civ. II, No. 
152, ¶ 98 (Fr.). In that case, an Italian magazine had published a story concerning, not only public 
facts regarding actress Romy Schneider’s second marriage and pregnancy, but also private 
information about her psychological state regarding the events. The court held that, despite Ms. 
Schneider’s fame, she was entitled to certain expectations regarding her private life, which had been 
violated by the magazine. So while the magazine would ordinarily be allowed to publish material by 
relying on freedom of speech, it could not do so where that publication infringed upon an individual’s 
private life. 
90  GRUNDEGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, supra note 20, arts. 1, 2. 
91  Id. at art. 1. 
92  Id. at art. 2. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 1, 1999, Entscheidungen Des 
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 50, 133, translation at https://law.utexas.edu/ 
transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=726. 
96  Id. 
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and lead to a stigmatisation of the person concerned in such a way that he is 
likely to suffer from social exclusion or isolation.97 
However, there are limits to personality rights. The Court has held that 
“[p]ersonality interests must as a rule take second place to freedom of opinion if 
the disputed statement has as its subject facts which are to be regarded as true.”98 
The Court’s statements are not definitive, objective guidance; therefore, this leaves 
the determination of which way the balance swings on a case-by-case basis.99 
Privacy rights in Europe are broad, “cover[ing] the physical and 
psychological integrity of a person[, including] a person’s right to their image[, and 
thus] personal information which individuals can legitimately expect should not 
be published without their consent.”100 The desire to protect personality rights is 
strongly entrenched within European society and is reflected in the Directive, 
which is meant to protect individual privacy, and by extension personality, rights 
against data controllers. This emphasis likely influenced the CJEU to interpret the 
Directive as broadly encompassing all data controllers, including internal search 
engines. 
VI.  HOW THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN CAN BE 
IMPLEMENTED GLOBALLY  
The right to be forgotten in the European context is broad, and likely 
includes both general and internal search engines. It affects all E.U. member states 
now and will likely spill outside Europe’s borders in the future. Many States have 
expressed an interest in adopting this right to protect their citizens’ online privacy. 
The right to be forgotten can be a useful tool to protect individuals’ online privacy 
rights. Currently, no international law that applies outside the E.U. contains an 
explicit right to be forgotten, and it would be a difficult feat to enact such a 
provision due to the extreme variances in each country’s fundamental values, 
legislation, and case law. 
However, there may be some options available to the international 
community to effectuate this as a growing number of States seek to implement 
personal data protections for their citizens. First, existing international treaties can 
incorporate the right to be forgotten and, like the Directive, act as baselines upon 
which countries can expand with their own local legislation. The best vehicle for 
                                                 
97 Lawrence Siry & Sandra Schmitz, A Right to Be Forgotten? – How Recent Developments in Germany May 
Affect the Internet Publishers in the US, 4 EUR. J. L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2012). 
98 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 24, 1998, Entscheidungen 
Des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 97, 391 (Ger.), translation at http://germanlawarchive. 
iuscomp.org/?s=lebach&submit=. 
99  Sirv & Schmitz, supra note 101, at 4. 
100  Axel Springer AG v. Germany, App. No. 39954/08, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 83, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109034 (last visited Apr. 21, 2016). 
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this will likely be the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
recognizes a person’s right to privacy.101 Second, the international community 
could leave it up to the search engines to make available their delisting practices 
globally, thereby avoiding the need to overhaul national laws. 
The prospect of developing an international right to be forgotten convention 
seems daunting due to disparate experiences and values across the globe. 
However, scholars have noted a trend: while Germany is a pioneer and champion 
of recognizing privacy rights, a growing number of countries have adopted these 
rights into their constitutions, legislation, and case law.102 Humanity has been 
revitalized in light of past and recent atrocities, such as Apartheid and the 
Holocaust.103 When fundamental rights compete, many States protect human 
dignity and privacy rights at the expense of unrestrained speech.104 
Because the Internet makes it easier to invade individual privacy and tarnish 
reputations, many countries, including Hong Kong, South Korea, Canada, Russia, 
and South Africa, are actively pushing to adopt right to be forgotten-type 
legislation.105 Some have called for search engine giants, such as Google, to make 
their right to be forgotten policies and practices universal. This will likely be the 
most practical means of globally implementing the right before attempting to 
establish a law that considers each State’s unique prioritization of fundamental 
rights. 
This Section will survey several countries and regions outside the E.U., to 
determine whether and how the right to be forgotten could expand globally. It 
will also examine possible means of implementing this right internationally, if the 
right to be forgotten expands. 
A.   The Right to be Forgotten Around the World  
Although the rhetoric in the media appears to strongly oppose the right to 
be forgotten ruling, many governments act in favor of it. The international 
response to the right to be forgotten ruling has ranged across a spectrum. On one 
side, the E.U.’s Directive is expansive, including virtually every form of search 
engine within its scope in order to protect privacy rights. At the other end of the 
                                                 
101  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter “ICCPR”]. 
102  Marc Rotenberg, Preserving Privacy in the Information Society, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, 
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, http://www.unesco.org/webworld/infoethics_2/ 
eng/papers/paper_10.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2016). 
103  Thomas J. Webb, Verbal Poison—Criminalizing Hate Speech: A Comparative Analysis and a Proposal for the 
American System, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 445, 463 (2011). 
104  Id. 
105  Carbone, supra note 60, at 545. 
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spectrum is the U.S., which rejects the right to be forgotten and broad privacy 
rights in favor of maintaining its expansive freedom of speech rights.106 
As this is a developing right, not every country or region has a history of 
privacy rights or is taking definitive steps in either direction. But the international 
trend appears to be moving more toward the European approach of prioritizing 
privacy rights over free speech regarding online activity. The rest of this Section 
will attempt to organize various countries along the spectrum. 
First, on the E.U.-side of the spectrum, are Russia, Japan, and Hong Kong. 
Russia recently signed into law the right to be forgotten. This law specifically 
requires “search engines to delete links leading to spurious or dated information 
about Russian citizens should they request.”107 
Both Hong Kong and Japan have also expressed a desire to create a right to 
be forgotten for their citizens.108 In 2014, the Privacy Commissioner of Hong 
Kong, Allan Chiang Yam-wang, announced that he intended to lobby for Google 
to extend its right to be forgotten policy to Hong Kong and surrounding Asian 
countries.109 He admitted that, while freedom of speech is important, the right to 
be forgotten is equally important.110 Hong Kong has data privacy laws, but search 
engines do not fall under the law’s definition of “data user,”111 which is analogous 
to the Directive’s usage.112 This is why Hong Kong’s Privacy Commissioner has 
appealed to Google directly for their delisting service rather than attempt to create 
new legal means.113 Hong Kong’s privacy protection ordinance certainly provides 
some basis for the right to be forgotten. If Google were to deny the Privacy 
Commissioner’s request, Hong Kong could easily amend its privacy ordinance to 
formally adopt the right to be forgotten as against search engines.114 
                                                 
106  Shoor, supra note 16, at 492–93. 
107  Putin Signs “Right to be Forgotten” Bill into Law, RT (July 14, 2015, 2:41pm), http://on.rt.com/i4qc9r. 
108  As mentioned previously, Japan has ordered a search engine to delink data associated with a Japanese 
individual under its data privacy laws. This certainly lays the groundwork for adopting the right to 
be forgotten explicitly within Japan. See Cheryl Kemp, Right to be Forgotten Spreads to Japan as Google 
Deletes One-Third of E.U. Requests, WHIR, (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.thewhir.com/web-hosting-
news/right-forgotten-spreads-japan-google-deletes-one-third-eu-requests. 
109  Cannix Yau, Hong Kong to Lobby Google Over the ‘Right to be Forgotten,’ SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST 
(June 16, 2014, 9:31am), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1533618/privacy-chief-
allan-chiang-wants-right-be-forgotten-extended-asia?page=all. 
110  Id. 
111  A data user is defined as “a person who . . . controls the collection, holding, processing or use of the 
data.” Since search engines cannot be classified as persons, the data privacy act cannot apply to them. 
See Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance § 2, (2013) Cap. 486, 1 (H.K.) [hereinafter Personal Data 
Ordinance]. 
112  Yau, supra note 109. 
113  Id. 
114  Hong Kong’s data privacy act allows for the removal of personal data as a remedy to violations of 
the act. This is of course closer to the right to be forgotten than other privacy acts that only allow 
for the correction of personal data. See Personal Data Ordinance, supra note 115. 
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Recently, a Hong Kong court decision brought the territory one step closer 
to solidifying the right to be forgotten within its jurisdiction.115 In that decision, 
David Webb operated a website in Hong Kong containing certain Hong Kong 
business-related information.116 The website provided links to a case that listed the 
parties’ full names, even though a judicial order redacted their names 10 years after 
the case closed.117 Users could access the names by searching the “Who’s Who” 
search of Mr. Webb’s website.118 Under Hong Kong’s data privacy act, the Privacy 
Commissioner ordered Mr. Webb to remove the links from his website.119 The 
Administrative Appeals Board upheld the Privacy Commissioner’s enforcement 
order on July 13, 2015.120 Therefore, in certain circumstances Hong Kong is 
willing to protect privacy rights over the freedom of speech. 
Moving toward the middle of the spectrum are countries that have privacy 
laws or case law that applied right to be forgotten-type principles against search 
engines, but have not completely embraced the right. These include Singapore, 
various South American countries, Australia, and Canada. 
Both South Korea and Singapore protect data privacy.121 For example, 
Singapore adopted the Personal Data Protection Act, which it strictly enforces.122 
The Act allows individuals to have their online information corrected and for 
personal data to be destroyed.123 Therefore, it is conceivable that Singapore may 
soon apply the Act against search engines and adopt its own right to be forgotten. 
South American countries have bowed to pressure from the E.U. to enact 
data privacy laws that comply with the Directive.124 However, South American 
countries have not been vigilantly enforcing their data privacy laws, unlike 
Singapore and the E.U.125 South America may be more inclined to recognize the 
right to be forgotten within its own countries if the rest of the world follows the 
                                                 
115  Mark Parsons, Eugene Low, and Dominic Edmondson, A Right to be Forgotten in Hong Kong?, HOGAN 
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118  Id. 
119  Id. 
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E.U.; however the region does not appear to prioritize privacy rights enough to 
independently take the charge.126 
Australia lacks a right to be forgotten law, but it has begun to conceive of 
search engines’ active role in spreading potentially defamatory information. The 
Australian Law Reform Commission has proposed a “right to be deleted,” which 
would be analogous to the E.U.’s right to be forgotten.127 Support for this 
proposed law is varied.128 Some believe that Australia’s current data privacy and 
defamation laws are sufficient to address internet privacy concerns.129 But 
Australia’s current data privacy law merely allows individuals to receive 
compensation from an entity that breaches their privacy or have their information 
corrected.130 And while Australia’s judiciary applies the local defamation laws 
against search engines,131 there is currently no mechanism by which individuals 
can disassociate themselves from online information.132 The proposed right to be 
deleted would address this concern. 
Despite being a close physical and cultural neighbor of the U.S., Canada 
aligns more closely with the E.U. regarding privacy rights. While neither the 
Canadian Constitution nor the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has an explicit 
privacy right,133 the right has cemented its place in case law. Following quickly on 
the heels of the right to be forgotten ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada held in 
R. v. Spencer that individuals have a “reasonable expectation of anonymity.”134 This 
language reflects the theme behind the right to be forgotten. In that case, the 
Supreme Court of Canada dealt with questions regarding individual privacy rights 
where a man kept a file of child pornography on his computer.135 The man’s 
internet provider handed over his IP address and subscriber information, against 
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his wishes, to the police upon their request when investigating him.136 The court 
acknowledged that individuals’ privacy rights must extend to their online data, 
stating that “[t]he identity of a person linked to their use of the Internet must be 
recognized as giving rise to a privacy interest beyond that inherent in the person’s 
name, address and telephone number found in the subscriber information.”137 
However, Canada also exhibits skepticism about creating a right to be 
forgotten law––especially against search engines––which differs from the E.U.’s 
attitude. There is some doubt as to whether the CJEU’s right to be forgotten ruling 
can be applied just yet in Canada. In 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada 
distinguished between producing defamatory content and providing a hyperlink 
to already published data.138 It held that the latter did not itself cause harm.139 Thus, 
Canadian privacy laws do not automatically require search engines to remove 
personal data under the current privacy laws; publishers of personal data are, on 
the other hand, required to do so.140 
Notably, Canada’s privacy act, the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act, provides the basis for adopting a future right to be 
forgotten. Like the Directive, Canada’s privacy act requires personal data to be 
“accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary for the purposes for which it 
is to be used.”141 And it applies its provisions broadly to “organizations,”142 which 
could include search engines in the future. The Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, which is typically the first stop for a data privacy 
complaint, has hinted that this could be the direction Canada is headed. In one 
instance, the Privacy Commissioner made a search engine remove the URL link 
to the complainant’s resume after she had posted it on a job search website.143 
This happened after the 2011 case mentioned above, which illustrates how 
Canada’s view of search engines is changing. 
In another case dealing with a search engines, the Privacy Commissioner 
recommended that a website “remove [the] decisions from search engine 
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caches.”144 The website collected and stored Canadian court and tribunal cases 
through its search engine, thus allowing users to find the information by searching 
for individuals’ names.145 The website itself did not add or publish additional 
personal information aside from providing links to the court cases.146 To date, the 
website has refused to comply with the Privacy Commissioner’s recommendation, 
but the Privacy Commissioner maintains its continued interest in this matter and 
may pursue it through the courts.147 Canada appears to be cognizant of personal 
data privacy threats, but is taking a conservative approach to applying a right to 
be forgotten-type rule. 
Finally, New Zealand is perhaps the closest to the U.S.-end of the spectrum 
in that it has not recognized a right to be forgotten. However, it is not ruling the 
possibility out.148 Instead, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner in New Zealand 
is adopting a wait-and-see approach.149 New Zealand, like most countries, has its 
own privacy act and tort, which the Privacy Commissioner believes adequately 
addresses Internet privacy concerns for the time being.150 Yet New Zealand’s 
Privacy Act only allows for individuals to demand that their online personal data 
be corrected if it is “[in]accurate, [outdated], [in]complete, [ir]relevant, or . . . 
misleading.151 The right to be forgotten is more than just ensuring personal data is 
accurate; it provides a means for individuals to disassociate themselves from their 
past. Overall, New Zealand is skeptical of the right to be forgotten’s efficacy and 
likely will not adopt it anytime soon. 
A number of countries are seriously considering the right to be forgotten, or 
at least online privacy rights. Perhaps the challenge will be implementing this right 
under the varying international legal regimes. However, there is real concern over 
the serious impact caused by having search engines of all forms forever linking a 
person’s name to past negative associations. Yet the U.S. remains one of the 
clearest regime contrasts to countries that have adopted the right to be forgotten 
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due to its opposing prioritization of freedom of speech. Despite this, at least one 
poll suggests that Americans actually want the U.S. to recognize a right to be 
forgotten.152 This may be impossible to achieve, however, under the current 
understanding of the First Amendment.153 Although human dignity, and by 
extension privacy rights and the right to be forgotten, is an important value in the 
U.S., it does not supersede the Constitutional freedom of speech.154 
The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law in the United States.155 Human 
dignity and privacy rights may be implied in the Constitution under the 9th, 13th, 
and 14th Amendments’ recognition of equality.156 However, the 14th 
Amendment, for example, applies strictly against the State but does not restrict 
the actions of private citizens or entities, including search engines like Google.157 
No constitutional basis exists to apply human dignity rights against private search 
engines.158 
And ultimately freedom of speech still has the upper hand over implied 
human dignity rights, as the latter apply only in narrow circumstances.159 U.S. case 
law reinforces the idea that the right to be forgotten and privacy rights fall in the 
shadows of the right to free speech.160 
Over time the U.S. could become more amenable to protecting broader 
privacy rights. On September 23, 2013, California enacted a right to be forgotten-
type law specifically for minors, whereby minors may demand that an internet 
website operator remove certain personal data.161 This does not apply to search 
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engines at the moment, although it appears that the door toward a nationwide 
right to be forgotten law has been opened a crack. Ultimately, however, the U.S. 
appears steadfast in promoting the First Amendment’s freedom of speech over 
privacy rights, which are merely implied and limited in scope.162 
Even if the U.S. never adopts a right to be forgotten, American data 
controllers, including search engines, operating in jurisdictions that recognize the 
right to be forgotten, will have to operate within the right’s parameters. This may 
place Americans at a disadvantage: people around the world will be able to protect 
their reputations and control their personal data, but Americans will not enjoy this 
right. Considering the international trend, the U.S. can choose either to remain an 
outlier or acknowledge the value in protecting privacy rights and the right to be 
forgotten over the freedom of speech in certain circumstances. The right to be 
forgotten does not mean the end of free speech—freedom of speech is not 
absolute even within the U.S.—and it will likely endure refining due to the 
overbroad application to search engines. 
Regardless of how the U.S. acts, it is apparent that the E.U. will not be alone 
in implementing the right to be forgotten. And with growing international 
support, the right will evolve to accommodate new notions of privacy. 
B.  Search Engines Should Impose the Right to be Forgotten 
Internationally  
To truly comply with the right to be forgotten and ensure the protection of 
personal privacy rights, it may be constructive for Google and other search 
engines to expand delisting practices into a global policy. The fact that there are 
many countries around the world that support, and actively lobby for, this benefit 
may make this a popular choice. Currently, the right to be forgotten is ambiguous, 
with little case law providing guidance as to its compliance. Imposing an 
international right to be forgotten law against all forms of search engines is not 
practical. Countries are still in the process of determining how the right to be 
forgotten fits in with their current data privacy laws, and whether search engines 
should even be subject to those laws. If left up to each country to incorporate the 
right to be forgotten into their legislation, global adoption of this right will not 
likely occur any time soon, if at all, due to the lengthy process involved in drafting 
and implementing new laws. Therefore, as the Privacy Commissioner of Hong 
Kong has suggested, search engines themselves could apply their delisting 
practices across the world. 
Google has already had to develop its own metric to sort through which 
right to be forgotten requests are valid. It may be beneficial to take New Zealand’s 
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wait-and-see approach to observe how well that metric adheres to the right to be 
forgotten’s objectives. Google has already independently extended its right to be 
forgotten services to Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, and Lichtenstein.163 
Additionally, Google now “remove[s] pages from [its] search results when 
required by local law.”164 For example, Google obliged when the Tokyo District 
Court “ordered Google to delete about half of the search results for a man linked 
to a crime he didn’t commit” under Japan’s privacy laws.165 
Following the CJEU’s ruling, Google assembled an Advisory Committee to 
Google on the right to be forgotten to determine how Google should proceed 
under the ruling, and where.166 The Committee published its findings in January 
2015.167 Geographically, the Committee recommended that Google apply its 
delisting practices to “nationally directed versions of Google’s search services [for 
example, google.de for Germany] within the E.U.168 However, it did not rule out 
the possibility of expanding this practice to countries outside the E.U. 
It is important to note that, even where Google delists a particular website 
per a right to be forgotten request from the appropriate national version of 
Google, the data can still be accessed through other national versions of Google, 
or simply Google.com. Therefore, the efficacy of Google’s delisting practices is 
called into question since the delisted personal data is not truly “forgotten.” It is 
possible for Google to prevent this circumvention by blocking E.U. Internet 
users’ access to delisted personal data across all European national Google 
searches.169 However, Google may not necessarily be able to prevent users outside 
the E.U. from accessing that data within the E.U. through their own national 
Google searches.170 Therefore, so long as this restriction would only apply to E.U. 
territory, and leaves the rest of the world’s Internet users free to access the data, 
the right to be forgotten’s purpose is not truly met. Further, the Committee raised 
concerns of a “repressive regime[ ]” if Google were to control only E.U. citizens’ 
access to online data.171 
However, Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel for Google, opined that 
Google would delist personal data only from the particular national Google search 
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where the request was made.172 He cited the perceived threat to freedom of 
speech, and variations in local laws as to what speech is not legal, as justification.173 
This suggests that local governments must clearly define the right to be forgotten’s 
limits within their jurisdictions, and move toward a more international consensus 
on the need for this right’s protection and possible restrictions on free speech. 
Once that happens Google, and other large search engines, can lead the charge in 
extending their delisting practices to citizens across the globe. 
VII.  CONCLUSION  
Ever since the CJEU published its right to be forgotten ruling, much debate 
has surrounded its scope. Both the Directive and the right to be forgotten ruling 
fail to define what a search engine is. This is an important oversight. If the 
Directive is over-inclusive, it will allow censorship of virtually the entire Internet. 
However, if it is under-inclusive, it may not protect individuals’ privacy rights. 
While general search engines like Google and Yahoo are better able to shoulder 
the financial costs of complying with the right to be forgotten, the ruling suggests 
it also applies to internal search engines. Therefore, as it stands, the right to be 
forgotten encompasses not only source websites, but every form of search engine 
and feature, thereby providing citizens with multiple avenues to suppress their 
online personal data. 
This is quite an extreme implication of the right to be forgotten. Since the 
concerns over privacy rights, which provide the basis for the right to be forgotten, 
are shared around the world, the question is whether the right will become a global 
phenomenon. Based on how many countries currently view privacy rights in 
relation to freedom of speech, it appears that they are open to adopting some sort 
of right to be forgotten. Perhaps the right to be forgotten ruling can be seen as 
defining the outer bounds of the right, leaving it up to individual countries to 
narrow the scope over time. 
And while it appears as though the right to be forgotten will eventually have 
a stronger international presence, it will take time for it and privacy rights to 
develop at the local level. Through trial and error, limits and balances will be 
established to maintain the public’s need to know while also protecting 
individuals’ privacy rights. Once this happens, the international community may 
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choose to make the right to be forgotten an official part of the privacy rights 
guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights. Until then, 
search engines instead will have to take the lead on implementing a global delisting 
practice, thereby eliminating difficult negotiations between countries and creating 
the groundwork for the right’s international acceptance. 
Problems with data privacy are increasing rapidly as people upload more and 
more of their lives onto the internet. More countries will therefore be motivated 
to protect their citizens’ data privacy. Countries interested in recognizing a right 
to be forgotten will likely want search engines to honor their citizens’ right to be 
forgotten requests, as they do with E.U. citizens’ requests. Eventually, more of 
these countries will demand that search engines geographically expand their 
delisting practices; in turn, search engines will grow more willing to do so. 
